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The Writing’s on the Wall: The Intent Requirement 
in Louisiana Destination Law 
INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes, neighbors are a pain. Overhanging tree branches, 
unmowed lawns, or loud dogs could get under anyone’s skin. 
However, neighbors sometimes go too far. Imagine that your 
house’s water supply is piped in from a reservoir on your 
neighbor’s property. The pipe connecting your house to the 
reservoir is above ground. Some time ago, both your lot and your 
neighbor’s lot belonged to a single, “common” owner. In preparing 
to sell both lots, the common owner built the reservoir and pipe. 
When he sold the properties, however, the common owner 
neglected to say anything about the arrangement. Years later, your 
neighbor decides that he is sick of looking at the reservoir and 
decides that it is time to tear it down. When you complain, he 
points out that you and he never contracted to maintain the 
situation. Infuriated, you seek a court order trying to stop him from 
destroying your access to the reservoir. 
If this scenario occurred in any state but Louisiana, you might 
be out of luck. Many common law jurisdictions have refused to 
recognize “easements by implication”—burdens on an estate 
created without an express grant such as the pipeline situation 
described above—except in a few narrow circumstances.1 If the 
above hypothetical occurred in Louisiana, however, you would 
probably have a valid claim. The Louisiana Civil Code recognizes 
that, in some scenarios, an estate can be burdened without the 
agreement of the owners.2 One of these methods, taken directly 
from the French Civil Code, is known as “destination of the 
owner.”3 Destination of the owner can arise in two ways: (1) The 
owner of an estate creates a burden, or “charge,” in favor of one 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by MARSHALL L. PERKINS. This Comment relies on 
numerous sources in the original French. Unless otherwise indicated, all 
translations are by the author. 
 1. See, e.g., Van Sandt v. Royster, 83 P.2d 698 (Kan. 1938) (reasoning that 
an easement by implication by prior use is difficult to justify when the implied 
benefit is being claimed by the grantor); Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 
1950) (stating that Texas courts only recognize easements by implication by 
strict necessity). See also 28A C.J.S. Easements § 21 (2011). An in-depth 
discussion of common-law easements by implication is outside the scope of this 
Comment, which is solely concerned with Louisiana property law.  
 2. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 3. Destination is based on the French Civil Code regime of destination du 
père de famille or “destination of the father of the family.” See discussion infra 
Part I.C–D. 




portion of the estate, then later transfers ownership of one or both 
portions; or (2) the common owner of two estates creates a charge 
on one in favor of the other, then later transfers ownership of one 
or both estates.4 Under Louisiana Civil Code article 741, once the 
estates cease to belong to the same owner, a predial servitude—the 
civilian counterpart of an easement5—comes into existence unless 
the parties expressly agree otherwise.6  
Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that a party 
who asserts that a predial servitude was created by destination must 
prove the “intent” of the common owner to create the servitude.7 
According to the court, evidence of the common owner’s intent 
consists of exterior signs of the servitude at the time common 
ownership ceases.8 The supreme court based its reasoning on the 
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s earlier application of 
this intent requirement.9 
This Comment argues that the subjective intent requirement is 
highly questionable and should be abandoned in favor of a more 
objective standard. Because destination issues arise only in the 
absence of an agreement between the parties, destination implies a 
fictional agreement between them.10 Because no actual agreement 
exists between the parties, the question is whether the parties should 
have reasonably believed that a servitude would be created.11 This 
determination is based upon the obvious signs of a burden on one of 
the estates in favor of the other.12 That objective inquiry efficiently 
resolves destination disputes by simply determining whether the 
situation was apparent, or “perceivable by exterior works, signs, or 
                                                                                                             
 4. See A. N. Yiannopoulos, Creation of Servitudes by Prescription and 
Destination of the Owner, 43 LA. L. REV. 57, 77 (1982).  
 5. Rose v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 508 F.3d 773, 776–77 (5th Cir. 2007).  
 6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 (2011). Article 741 provides:  
Destination of the owner is a relationship established between two 
estates owned by the same owner that would be a predial servitude 
if the estates belonged to different owners. 
When the two estates cease to belong to the same owner, unless 
there is express provision to the contrary, an apparent servitude 
comes into existence of right and a nonapparent servitude comes 
into existence if the owner has previously filed for registry in the 
conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is located 
a formal declaration establishing the destination.  
Id. 
 7. Phipps v. Schupp, 45 So. 3d 593, 598–602 (La. 2010). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id.; see also discussion infra Part I.C. 
 10. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 11. See Lee Hargrave, Property—Review of Recent Developments: 1991–
1992, 53 LA. L. REV. 953, 960 (1993). 
 12. Id. 




constructions.”13 A requirement that a party provide evidence of the 
common owner’s subjective intent invites inefficiency and 
uncertainty into this area of the law and should therefore be 
eliminated.14 
Accordingly, this Comment analyzes the reasoning behind the 
jurisprudential intent requirement. Part I provides the relevant codal 
and historical background of destination. Part II discusses how the 
intent requirement entered into the jurisprudential application of 
article 741. Part III analyzes the relevant French doctrine on the 
issue. Part IV examines the conceptual and practical difficulties that 
the intent requirement presents and concludes that courts should take 
an objective approach in applying article 741. The approach should 
be framed in terms of a tacit agreement between the parties to 
continue the relationship that existed at the time that the estates 
ceased to belong to the same owner. If there is any element of 
subjective intent in a destination case, it is only a bilateral tacit 
intention between the parties at the moment ownership is severed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The following discussion defines predial servitudes and explains 
how they are created under the civilian idea of “destination of the 
                                                                                                             
 13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 707 (2011). 
 14. Destination claims arise more often than the reader might think. See, 
e.g., Huy Tuyet Tran v. Misuraca, No. 2010 CA 2183, 2011 WL 2617382 (La. 
Ct. App. 1st May 6, 2011) (holding that a servitude of passage was created by 
destination of the owner); Davis v. Provost, 980 So. 2d 821, 826 (La. Ct. App. 
3d 2008) (discussing creation of servitudes by destination); Trunk v. Berg, 866 
So. 2d 922, 928 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2004) (refusing to apply article 741 
retroactively); W.L. Wagner v. Fairway Villas Condominium Assocs., Inc., 813 
So. 2d 512, 517 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2002) (holding that because underground pipes 
were nonapparent, no servitude of aqueduct was created under article 741); 
Jackson v. Jackson, 818 So. 2d 192, 197–98 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2002) (concluding 
that an apparent servitude of drain was created the moment that the property was 
partitioned); Griffith v. Cathey, 762 So. 2d 29 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2002) (holding 
that because plaintiff never owned defendants property, no servitude could be 
created by destination); Comby v. White, 737 So. 2d 94, 96–97 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
1999) (finding that utility lines constituted evidence of apparent servitude 
existing at severance of ownership); McCann v. Normand, 696 So. 2d 203, 206–
07 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1997) (holding that because article 741 is a substantive law, 
it cannot be applied retroactively); Williams v. Wiggins, 641 So. 2d 1068, 1073 
(La. Ct. App. 2d 1994) (noting that the servitude must be created by an owner, 
not a lessee, for destination to apply); Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Kirby Exploration 
Co. of Tex., 909 F.2d 811, 814–15 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a pipeline 
servitude would have been created by destination if Louisiana law had applied); 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Badine, No. 93-4065, 1994 WL 577482 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 
1994) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether common owner 
intended to create a servitude of passage). 




owner.” The discussion then addresses the French roots of 
destination and how Louisiana law on the issue has evolved. 
A. Predial Servitudes: Definition, Nature, and Distinctions 
The Louisiana Civil Code defines a predial servitude as “a 
charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate.”15 
Examples of predial servitudes include rights of drain, view, light, 
passage, drawing water, aqueduct, and pasturage.16 A fundamental 
tenet of predial servitudes is that in order for one to exist, the 
dominant and servient estates must belong to different owners.17 
Furthermore, a benefit to the dominant estate is essential.18 
Without a benefit to the dominant estate, the servitude is merely a 
personal, or “credit,” right in favor of the estate’s owner.19  
There are three types of predial servitudes: natural, legal, and 
conventional.20 Natural servitudes owe their existence to the 
natural situation of estates, such as a servitude of drainage when an 
estate is situated above another.21 Legal servitudes, as the name 
suggests, are established by law for the benefit of the general 
public or the benefit of particular persons.22 Examples of legal 
servitudes include the obligation to keep a building in repair,23 the 
prohibition of projecting over a boundary,24 and the prohibition of 
making an opening in a common wall.25 Lastly, voluntary, or 
“conventional,” predial servitudes are established by juridical act, 
acquisitive prescription, or destination of the owner.26 This 
Comment concerns only conventional predial servitudes.  
A key distinction, particularly for the purposes of this Comment, 
lies in the classification of a predial servitude as either apparent or 
nonapparent. Apparent servitudes are “perceivable by exterior signs, 
works, or constructions; such as a roadway, a window in a common 
wall, or an aqueduct.”27 Nonapparent servitudes, on the other hand, 
                                                                                                             
 15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646. 
 16. Id. art. 699.  
 17. Id. art. 646. This provision is an application of the Roman maxim nemini 
res sua servit (no one has a right of servitude in his own property). Id. art. 646 
cmt. f.  
 18. Id. art. 647.  
 19. See id. art. 647 cmt. c. 
 20. Id. art. 654.  
 21. Id. art. 655. 
 22. Id. art. 659.  
 23. Id. art. 660.  
 24. Id. art. 663.  
 25. Id. art. 681.  
 26. Id. art. 654. 
 27. Id. art. 707.  




have no exterior signs of their existence.28 Examples of nonapparent 
servitudes include the prohibition of building on an estate or the 
prohibition of building above a certain height.29 Apparent servitudes 
may be acquired by title, acquisitive prescription, or destination.30 
Title means an act translative of ownership, such as a contract of 
sale.31 Title also contemplates a testament or partition.32 Unlike 
apparent servitudes, nonapparent servitudes can be acquired only by 
title.33 However, this rule is subject to one, distinct exception: If a 
common owner has previously filed a formal declaration of 
destination, then a nonapparent servitude may be acquired by 
destination of the owner if there is no express agreement otherwise 
between the parties.34  
B. Destination of the Owner—Article 741 
Most conventional and apparent predial servitudes are acquired 
by title.35 However, Louisiana law recognizes that conventional 
and apparent servitudes can be acquired without title in two ways: 
by acquisitive prescription or by destination of the owner.36 
Louisiana Civil Code article 741 defines destination as follows: 
Destination of the owner is a relationship established between 
two estates owned by the same owner that would be a predial 
servitude if the estates belonged to different owners. 
 
When the two estates cease to belong to the same owner, 
unless there is express provision to the contrary, an apparent 
servitude comes into existence of right and a nonapparent 
servitude comes into existence if the owner has previously 
filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in 
which the immovable is located a formal declaration 
establishing the destination.37 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. art. 740.  
 31. See id. art. 3483 cmt. b. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. art. 739. 
 34. See id. art. 741. A “formal declaration of destination” simply means a title 
filed in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is located. 
Id.; id. art. 739. 
 35. See id. art. 722 cmt. b. Predial servitudes may be created in any manner 
that immovables may be transferred. Id.  
 36. Id. arts. 740, 741. Acquisitive prescription is not discussed in this Comment. 
 37. Id. art. 741. Current article 741 was revised in 1977 as part of the 
Louisiana Legislature’s extensive revision of the Code articles on predial 




A predial servitude cannot be created under article 741 unless 
the two estates belonged to the same owner and the common 
owner established the relationship giving rise to the servitude.38 
The “relationship established between two estates that would be a 
predial servitude” can arise in two distinct scenarios: (1) The 
owner of a single estate creates a charge in favor of one portion of 
the estate, then later transfers ownership of one or both portions; or 
(2) the common owner of two estates creates a charge on the 
servient estate in favor of the dominant estate, then later transfers 
ownership of one or both estates.39 Article 741 expressly states that 
at the moment the dominant and servient estates cease to belong to 
the same person, an apparent predial servitude “comes into 
existence of right” unless there is a clear agreement otherwise.40 
Thus, even though there is no title regarding the servitude, the law 
nonetheless deems a conventional predial servitude to exist.41  
C. Destination’s French Origins  
The creation of predial servitudes by destination is a uniquely 
French civilian institution.42 The French refer to destination as la 
destination du père de famille (the destination of the father of the 
family).43 The provisions of the French Civil Code were drawn 
                                                                                                             
 
servitudes. See 1977 La. Acts 1309, 1335. Article 741 is based on a combination 
of articles 649, 767, 768, and 769 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. Id. art. 741 
cmt. a. The effects of the revision are discussed infra in Part I.D.  
 38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 cmt. b. 
 39. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 77. 
 40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741.  
 41. It is somewhat odd that the Civil Code’s destination provision is found 
in the title covering conventional predial servitudes because destination is a 
suppletive legal rule, which is relevant only in the absence of an agreement. Id. 
If the law supplies the “agreement” between the parties that creates the 
servitude, destination should be characterized as a legal servitude, which, by 
definition, is “imposed by law.” Id. art. 654. Therefore, destination is arguably in 
the wrong part of the Code.  
 42. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 74 (noting that the historical basis 
for destination is grounded in the custom of Paris); 2 HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., 
LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL § 1721, at 408 (7th ed. 1989) (stating that “[destination] 
is a mode of acquisition of servitudes unknown to Roman law”); JEAN-LOUIS 
BERGEL, MARC BRUSCHI & SYLVIE CIMAMONTI, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL—LES 
BIENS § 343, at 344 (1st ed. 1999) (arguing that French customary law on 
destination differed by region but was consolidated in the first redaction of the 
Custom of Paris). 
 43. Although the French use a different term than the one used in Louisiana, 
it is well settled that “father of the family” simply refers to the previous common 
owner of the two estates. See, e.g., PATRICE JOURDAIN, LES BIENS § 155, at 212 




from the Custom of Paris, an early redaction of regional French 
customary law.44  
French doctrine differs as to the reasoning behind the 
institution of destination.45 Some writers believe that for destination 
to apply, the common owner must intend to create a predial 
servitude and that such intent must be evidenced with exterior 
signs.46 Although several French writers accept this basis for 
destination, others are not so convinced.47 For example, some 
writers reject the intent idea altogether as conceptually impossible,48 
while others consider the common owner’s intent to be important 
only in instances where the extent of a predial servitude is at issue.49 
Despite their differing opinions on destination, most French 
writers—in one way or another—agree that destination is based on 
the idea of a “tacit convention” between the parties that the 
existing state of affairs will be maintained.50 In other words, “tacit 
convention” or “tacit agreement” theory provides that the owners 
of two estates, at the moment that unitary ownership ceases, 
                                                                                                             
 
(1995) (“Destination of the father of the family is a particular arrangement 
between estates established by the common owner of them . . . .”); 5 GABRIEL 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & EMILE CHAUVEAU, TRAITÉ THEÓRIQUE ET PRATIQUE 
DE DROIT CIVIL § 1115, at 845 (2d ed. 1899) (“[T]he situation established by the 
father of the family, meaning the owner of the two immovables . . . .”); 2 
VICTOR MARCADÉ, EXPLICATION THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL § 
694, at 642 (8th ed. 1886) (“[D]estination of the pater familias, meaning the 
owner of the estates . . . .”).  
 44. 3 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT 
CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 966, at 946 n.3 (2d ed. 1952) (noting that the formula for the 
French Civil Code articles on destination is found in the Custom of Paris, apart 
from the Custom’s writing requirement); FRANÇOIS TERRÉ & PHILLIPE SIMLER, 
DROIT CIVIL—LES BIENS § 830, at 677 n.2 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that 
destination’s original foundation is the Custom of Paris). 
 45. Compare PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, §§ 966, 968, at 946–48 
(asserting that the common owner must intend to create a servitude and that such 
intent must be evidenced by exterior signs), with BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & 
CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 846 (arguing that the creation of predial 
servitudes by destination of the owner is founded only on a “tacit convention” 
between subsequent owners that the former owner’s state of affairs would 
remain in place). 
 46. See discussion infra Part III.A.1–4. 
 47. See discussion infra Part III.B.1–3. 
 48. 8 FRANÇOIS LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 172, at 
204 (2d ed. 1876). 
 49. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 845 
n.1. 
 50. See, e.g., PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, § 966, at 946; BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & CHAUVEAU, supra note 43, § 1115, at 844–45; MAZEAUD ET 
AL., supra note 42, § 1721, at 410. 




implicitly agree that an apparent predial servitude will be created.51 
Under tacit agreement theory, one simply looks to whether an 
apparent burden existed between two estates at the moment that 
they ceased to be owned by the same person.52 In that case, the 
parties will be deemed by law to have tacitly agreed that the 
situation will continue to remain in effect.53 The tacit agreement 
thus serves as a form of unwritten title to a conventional predial 
servitude.54  
D. Evolution of Louisiana’s Destination Regime 
The Louisiana Legislature extensively revised the Code articles 
governing predial servitudes in 1977.55 Current Civil Code article 
741 is based on a combination of articles 649, 767, 768, and 769 of 
the Civil Code of 1870.56 Until the 1977 revision, Louisiana’s 
articles on destination were translations of the counterpart articles 
in the Napoleonic Code, which remain in effect in France.57  
Article 767 of the 1870 Code equated destination to title with 
respect to continuous and apparent servitudes.58 Although article 
                                                                                                             
 51. LAURENT, supra note 48, § 172, at 204.  
 52. 3 CHARLES AUBRY & FRÉDÉRIC CHARLES RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS § 252, at 118 (6th ed. 1938).  
 53. LAURENT, supra note 48, § 172, at 203–04. 
 54. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 44, § 966, at 946. 
 55. 1977 La. Acts 1309.  
 56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 cmt. a (2011). Article 649 of the Code of 1870 
simply referenced the other articles and will not be discussed here. See 2008 
COMPILED EDITION OF CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA 640–42 (A. N. Yiannopoulos 
ed., 2008) [hereinafter 2008 COMPILED CODES]. Article 769 of the 1870 Code 
was a translation of article 694 of the Code Napoleon. Id. It was adopted in the 
second operative paragraph of current article 741. Id. However, article 741 
differs because it now allows both apparent and nonapparent servitudes to be 
created by destination. Id. Furthermore, article 741 now simply states that an 
apparent servitude “comes into existence of right” unless there is an express 
provision otherwise. Id. 
 57. See 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640–42; see also CODE 
CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 692–694 (Fr.).  
 58. 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640. The 1977 revision did away 
with the distinction between continuous and discontinuous servitudes. 
Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 75. Continuous servitudes were “those whose use 
may be continual, with or without the act of man,” such as the rights of aqueduct, 
view, and drain. Acadiana-Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co. v. Broussard, 175 So. 2d 
856, 859 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1965). Discontinuous servitudes required an act of man to 
be used, such as a right of passage or drawing water. Id. In Louisiana, both 
continuous and discontinuous servitudes may now be created by destination. 
Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 75. In France, the distinction remains relevant 
because only continuous servitudes may be created by destination. C. CIV. art. 692 
(Fr.). 




767 did not mention intent, its source provisions in the Louisiana 
Civil Codes of 1808 and 1825 did.59 Article 763 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code of 1825 stated: “[T]he use which the owner has 
intentionally established on a particular part of his property in 
favour [sic] of another part is equal to title, with respect to 
perpetual and apparent servitudes thereon.”60 The 1808 Code 
article was closer to that of the Napoleonic Code, providing: “The 
intention of the father of the family is equal to title, with respect to 
perpetual and apparent services.”61 The Legislature omitted the 
word intentionally from article 767 in the 1870 Code.62 After the 
1870 revision, the only mention of intent appeared in article 768.63 
That article provided for a presumption of the common owner’s 
intent.64 Article 768 read: “Such intention is never presumed till 
[sic] it has been proved that both estates, now divided, belonged to 
the same owner, and that it was by him that the things have been 
placed in the situation from which the servitudes result.”65 
Articles 767 and 768 of the Code of 1870 are both rooted in the 
English translations of the Napoleonic Code.66 A comparison of 
the English and French versions of the articles reveals that the 
English versions were, in fact, mistranslations.67 The word intent 
does not appear in either article of the Napoleonic Code.68 Article 
692 of the Napoleonic Code stated: “Destination of the father of 
the family is equal to title.”69 The English version of article 692 
mistranslated this clause as, “The intention of the father of the 
family is equal to title.”70 Similarly, the proper translation of the 
French version of article 693 reads, “There is only destination of 
the father of the family when it is proven,” but the English version 
states, “The intention of the father of the family is never presumed 
till [sic] it has been proved.”71 Accordingly, the word intent should 
probably have never been included in Louisiana’s destination 
regime because the French Code never provided for a presumption 
of intent.  
                                                                                                             
 59. See 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 641.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 640–41. 
 67. See id.; see also C. CIV. arts. 692–693 (Fr.).  
 68. See 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640–41; see also C. CIV. 
arts. 692–693 (Fr.). 
 69. 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640; C. CIV. art. 692 (Fr.). 
 70. 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 640; C. CIV. art. 692 (Fr.). 
 71. 2008 COMPILED CODES, supra note 56, at 641; C. CIV. art. 693 (Fr.). 




The mistranslated intent presumption of article 768 was not 
included in current article 741.72 However, the omission was not 
due to the mistranslation; the Louisiana Legislature chose not to 
include the intent presumption “because it relates to matters of 
proof.”73 The Legislature explained that “[i]t should be evident that 
there is no destination under Article 741 unless there is proof that 
the two estates belonged to the same owner and that it was he who 
established the relationship giving rise to the servitude.”74 In a 
1982 law review article regarding the revision, Professor 
Yiannopoulos stated, “The intent to establish a destination is no 
longer presumed; the court is free to draw the appropriate 
inferences from proof that the two estates belonged in the past to 
the same owner and that he erected the exterior signs of the 
servitude.”75  
After the Legislature chose to exclude the intent presumption 
from article 741, there is no mention of intent in the Louisiana 
Civil Code’s destination regime.76 It is unclear whether proof of 
intent is still required, whether the question of intent was done 
away with entirely, or whether intent should have ever been 
mentioned in the Civil Code in the first place. Accordingly, it is 
questionable whether the drafters of article 741 meant to allow 
courts to inquire into the subjective intent of a party in a 
destination case. The exclusion of article 768’s intent presumption 
has proved troublesome in that it arguably created a vacuum that 
allowed Louisiana courts to require plaintiffs to provide evidence 
of intent.77 
II. THE INTENT REQUIREMENT IN LOUISIANA 
Despite article 741’s silence on the issue of the common 
owner’s intent, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
requires evidence to that effect when a party claims destination.78 
Recently, in Phipps v. Schupp, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
implicitly adopted the intent requirement, although it questioned the 
                                                                                                             
 72. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 cmt. b (2011). 
 73. Id.; 1977 La. Acts 1335.  
 74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 741 cmt. b; 1977 La. Acts 1335.  
 75. Yiannopoulos, supra note 4, at 79 n.119.  
 76. LA CIV. CODE art. 741. 
 77. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 78. See 730 Bienville Partners, Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 596 
So. 2d 836, 839–40 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1992); Phipps v. Schupp, 19 So. 3d 38, 41 
(La. Ct. App. 4th 2009), vacated, 45 So. 3d 593 (La. 2010).  




fourth circuit’s factual findings and reversed the decision.79 The 
fourth circuit’s intent requirement is rooted in a familiar source. 
A. The Fountainhead: Professor Yiannopoulos  
Professor Yiannopoulos laid the groundwork for the fourth 
circuit’s intent requirement in his article discussing the 1977 codal 
revision.80 His article specifically focused on how the revision 
affected the law regarding conventional predial servitudes created by 
acquisitive prescription and destination.81 Professor Yiannopoulos 
concluded that, aside from a few significant alterations, the law 
remained essentially unchanged.82 He argued that the revised articles 
continue to relate to older versions of the Louisiana Civil Code and 
to the corresponding provisions of the French Civil Code.83 
Therefore, “prior Louisiana jurisprudence and doctrine, as well as 
French jurisprudence and doctrine, continue to be relevant for the 
interpretation and application of the new legislation.”84 
In the section of his article discussing destination, Professor 
Yiannopoulos wrote that the creation of such a servitude is based on 
a “tacit agreement” theory.85 Adhering to French doctrinal authority, 
Professor Yiannopoulos wrote that “[t]he law simply recognizes and 
enforces this tacit agreement that is the equivalent of title.”86 
Professor Yiannopoulos found that tacit agreement theory is based 
on historical precedent and accounts for the French doctrinal and 
jurisprudential interpretations of the French Civil Code articles on 
destination.87 
Professor Yiannopoulos wrote that, under article 741, in the 
absence of a formal recordation of destination, an apparent predial 
servitude is established by exterior signs on either the dominant or 
servient estate.88 Although the Louisiana Legislature dropped the 
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express requirement of “an apparent sign of servitude” in the 1977 
revision, there was no change in the law.89 Current Civil Code 
article 741 clearly states that only an apparent predial servitude 
“comes into existence of right” at the moment the two estates cease 
to belong to the same owner.90 By definition, apparent predial 
servitudes are evidenced by exterior works, signs, or constructions;91 
therefore, according to Professor Yiannopoulos, the omission of the 
“apparent sign of servitude” language was immaterial because the 
redactors contemplated the same situation.92  
However, Professor Yiannopoulos did not end his discussion 
there. He stated:  
According to French doctrine and jurisprudence that ought to 
be pertinent for Louisiana, the exterior sign must be 
characteristic of the particular kind of servitude that the 
owner of the dominant estate claims and it must also be 
indicative of the intent of the former owner to establish the 
servitude.93 
This sentence was of major importance to the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeal when it later applied the intent requirement.94 Although 
Professor Yiannopoulos downplayed the significance of the 
exclusion of former article 768’s intent presumption,95 the fourth 
circuit appeared to take advantage of it.  
B. The Application: Bienville  
Ten years after Professor Yiannopoulos’s article, the Louisiana 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal accepted his theories in a seminal 
destination case: 730 Bienville Partners v. First National Bank of 
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Commerce.96 Having been “free[d] to draw the appropriate 
inferences”97 regarding the common owner’s intent, the court 
declined to find such intent in Bienville.98 The facts of the case 
occurred in the New Orleans French Quarter.99 The property in 
question consisted of three contiguous tracts between Iberville and 
Bienville streets—the St. Louis Hotel, Parcel K, and the Solari 
parking garage.100  
 
In 1980, Royal Bienville Investors, Ltd. (Royal)101 purchased 
all three lots. Royal went bankrupt in 1986 and transferred its 
ownership interest in the garage and Parcel K.102 However, Royal 
retained its ownership interest in the hotel.103 Royal thereafter 
leased spaces for hotel guests in the garage.104 First National Bank 
of Commerce (First NBC) was granted a mortgage on the garage in 
1990.105 Royal ultimately transferred its interest in the hotel to 730 
Bienville Partners, Ltd. (730 Bienville)106 in 1990.107 
The dispute arose in December 1990 when the hotel terminated 
its parking agreement with the garage.108 Westminster Parking, 
which operated the garage, then informed 730 Bienville of its 
intent to close a doorway between Parcel K and the garage, thereby 
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denying passage from the hotel through the garage to Iberville 
Street.109 First NBC subsequently directed Westminster Parking to 
block the doorway in early January.110 
Next, 730 Bienville sued First NBC to prevent the doorway’s 
closure.111 It argued that an apparent predial servitude of passage 
via the doorway existed in favor of the hotel.112 The thrust of 730 
Bienville’s claim was that the servitude was created by destination 
in 1986 when the three lots ceased to belong to Royal alone.113 The 
trial court disagreed.114 It ruled that no servitude was created by 
destination because hotel employees had used the doorway 
pursuant to a lease agreement and that the use of property pursuant 
to a lease does not create a servitude.115 The fourth circuit affirmed 
and held that 730 Bienville failed to prove that Royal intended to 
establish a servitude of passage to and from Iberville street.116 
The Fourth Circuit relied solely on Professor Yiannopoulos’s 
article in its reasoning.117 First, the court agreed with Professor 
Yiannopoulos that destination is based on tacit agreement theory.118 
Second, the court, paraphrasing Professor Yiannopoulos, held that 
“the common owner must intend to create an apparent servitude and 
such intent must be evidenced by exterior signs which are consistent 
with the nature and extent of the servitude claimed.”119 The 
Bienville Court held that the exterior signs in the instant case were 
not enough evidence to support Royal’s intent to use the garage as a 
servitude of passage.120 According to the court, the only exterior 
signs of a servitude of passage were located inside the garage, near 
the door leading to Parcel K.121 In the court’s view, because 730 
Bienville failed to prove the existence of exterior signs on Iberville 
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Street directing foot traffic toward the hotel, 730 Bienville failed to 
prove that Royal intended to create a passageway through the 
garage.122 The court further reasoned that in order for hotel patrons 
to use the doorway between the garage and Parcel K, they were 
required to park their cars in the garage first.123 This condition, 
according to the court, indicated that Royal did not intend that hotel 
guests and employees would be able to use the garage as a pathway 
to Iberville Street.124  
C. The Acceptance: Phipps 
The Bienville decision provided the basis for a similar result in 
the recent Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal case of Phipps 
v. Schupp.125 Again, the court held that destination did not apply 
because the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of the 
common owner’s intent to create a predial servitude.126 This time, 
however, the Louisiana Supreme Court took up the intent issue and 
reached the opposite conclusion from that of the lower courts.127 
Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court employed the fourth 
circuit’s intent requirement in its analysis, thereby implicitly 
adopting the doctrine. 
The Phipps dispute took place in the Uptown neighborhood of 
New Orleans.128 Before 1978, the two estates at issue constituted only 
one estate.129 Its boundaries consisted of Exposition Boulevard–
Audubon Park130 to the west, Patton Street to the north, and other 
residential properties to the south and east.131 In 1978, the owner split 
his lot into two separate properties: 541 and 543 Exposition 
Boulevard.132 Lot 541 thereafter had no direct access to a usable 
public road.133 In 1978, the owner sold 541, thereby enclosing the 
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estate.134 Before the sale, the owner created a driveway running over 




Plaintiff Roger Phipps bought 541 in 1982.136 He used the 
driveway as a vehicular passageway for over 20 years.137 In 2003, 
defendants Cynthia Schupp and Roland Cutrer, the owners of 543, 
built a carport enclosure in their backyard that partially obstructed 
the driveway so that vehicular passage to 541 became impossible.138 
Phipps continued to use the unobstructed portion as a walkway to 
and from Patton Street.139 In 2006, the defendants built a fence over 
the unobstructed portion, thereby completely blocking off the 
walkway.140 
Perhaps having exhausted any attempts at neighborly 
compromise, Phipps filed a possessory action seeking to have the 
court recognize a right of passage and order the defendants to 
remove their obstructions.141 Phipps argued that the presence of the 
driveway when the common owner first sold 541 in 1978 gave rise 
to a predial servitude by destination.142 The district court disagreed 
and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.143 The 
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court relied on the “intent” language of Bienville and held that 
Phipps had failed to demonstrate intent evidenced by exterior signs 
because “[t]he mere existence and use of a concrete driveway does 
not constitute a predial servitude.”144 
On appeal, the fourth circuit extensively reviewed its reasoning 
in Bienville and affirmed.145 The court concluded that historical use 
of a particular pathway by the common owner cannot serve as 
proof of intent; there must also be “exterior signs” demonstrating 
the nature and extent of the servitude claimed.146 Furthermore, the 
court held that existence of a contested pathway cannot alone serve 
as proof of intent.147 Therefore, because Phipps could only point to 
his own use of the driveway and its existence when the common 
owner sold 541, the court found that his destination claim lacked 
merit.148  
Because the case was decided on summary judgment, Phipps 
argued on appeal to the supreme court that material facts existed as 
to the evidence of the common owner’s intention.149 The supreme 
court agreed and remanded the case.150 The court distinguished 
Bienville, reasoning that, in that case, “there were no exterior signs 
indicating an existence of an apparent servitude.”151 All signs of a 
servitude in Bienville were located inside the garage and therefore 
were not “apparent” under the meaning of article 707.152 By 
contrast, the court reasoned that the driveway in Phipps could 
conceivably constitute a perceivable exterior sign under that 
article.153 After all, according to the court, the driveway visibly 
extended from Phipps’s garage through the defendants’ 
backyard.154  
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Interestingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted specific 
evidence for establishing the common owner’s intent in Phipps. 
First, Phipps had a key to the driveway’s gate.155 The court 
reasoned that if the key had been passed down from the common 
owner, then the owner must have intended the driveway to serve 
541.156 Secondly, the court stated that because the common owner 
needed to get approval from the city planning commission to 
subdivide his lots, he was required to abide by city planning 
regulations that required all parcels of land in a subdivision to have 
access to a public street.157 In the court’s view, because the 
commission approved of the subdivision, the common owner must 
have complied with the commission’s regulations.158 To the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, this suggested that the common owner 
must have intended 541 to have access to a public road.159 
D. The Extension: Post-Phipps Application of the Intent 
Requirement 
Despite its disagreement with the fourth circuit’s findings in 
Phipps, the supreme court did not do away with the intent 
requirement—to the contrary, it implicitly adopted the doctrine.160 
The court merely distinguished Bienville from Phipps; it did not 
disagree with Bienville’s reasoning.161 Furthermore, the Phipps 
court did not definitively resolve what exterior signs are sufficient to 
prove intent but only suggested what may be sufficient.162 While the 
court seemingly held that the existence of the driveway itself was an 
exterior sign evidencing intent, in actuality the court merely stated 
that this idea was “conceivable.”163 After Phipps, the definition of 
“sufficient proof of intent” remains nebulous.  
Not only is the intent requirement still a viable doctrine, it is 
now the interpretation of Louisiana’s highest court. Therefore, lower 
state courts will look to Phipps as a guide when considering a 
destination case and will apply the intent requirement accordingly. 
For the reasons discussed at length below, the supreme court’s 
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adoption of the requirement will obfuscate lower courts’ analyses of 
destination cases.164 The intent requirement should therefore be 
abandoned in favor of a simpler, more objective standard in order to 
lessen a court’s burden when faced with a destination issue.165 
III. LE DÉBAT:166 THE VARIANCE OF FRENCH DOCTRINE ON 
DESTINATION 
In his article, Professor Yiannopoulos asserted that because 
French doctrine and jurisprudence subscribe to the intent 
requirement, Louisiana law should follow suit.167 Admittedly, 
destination is a distinctly French civilian concept, and Louisiana’s 
codal regime is inarguably based on that of the French.168 
Professor Yiannopoulos is thus correct in stating that the French 
“ought to be pertinent” in this area.169 By the same token, a review 
of French doctrine reveals varying treatments of destination.170 If 
Louisiana law is to base the intent requirement on the French, as 
Professor Yiannopoulos argues,171 then that basis is questionable 
when one considers their disparate approaches.  
Professor Yiannopoulos’s argument that French doctrine 
supports the intent requirement especially loses force when one 
takes into account that he relied almost exclusively on Planiol.172 
Several French commentators view destination quite differently 
than Planiol does.173 Perhaps their analyses “ought to be 
pertinent”174 as well. The following analysis of original French 
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sources illustrates that French doctrine is split on whether the 
common owner’s intent has any relevance or whether destination is 
based only on tacit agreement theory. 
A. The “Intent Camp” 
Some writers subscribe to the theory that, in order for destination 
to apply, the apparent works must indicate that the common owner 
had the will to establish a servitude.175 This “intent camp” believes 
that the reason that the law recognizes destination is to respect the 
common owner’s wishes.176 The most eminent of the “intent 
scholars” is Planiol, as evidenced by Professor Yiannopoulos’s strong 
reliance on Planiol’s explanation of destination.177 Other writers in the 
intent camp include Pardessus, Toullier, and Henri Mazeaud.178 
 1. Planiol 
Planiol begins his discussion of destination by defining it as “the 
act by which a person establishes between two estates which belong 
to him (or between two parts of a same estate) a situation which 
would constitute a servitude if the estates belonged to two different 
owners.”179 When the estates cease to belong to the same owner, the 
servitude is “born” without title.180 Planiol then endorses tacit 
agreement theory as the conceptual justification for why the law 
grants the equivalent of title in these situations.181  
However, Planiol goes on to state that tacit agreement theory 
accounts for the jurisprudential requirement that the common owner 
have the intention of establishing a servitude.182 According to 
Planiol, there must exist on the dominant or servient estate an 
“apparent state of fact clearly characteristic of the servitude claimed, 
and revealing on the part of the common owner the will to establish, 
in a definitive and permanent manner, the subjugation of one of his 
estates to the other.”183 Works made for the personal convenience of 
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the owner therefore are not indicative of such intent.184 The state of 
fact must also exist at the moment of separation because the signs 
must support the idea of a tacit convention between the parties that a 
servitude exists.185  
 2. Pardessus 
Pardessus stresses that permanent exterior signs of an apparent 
servitude are determinative in destination cases.186 He writes that 
“without such signs, one would not be able to infer a will to create a 
true subjugation of one immovable to another.”187 In Pardessus’s 
view, the exterior signs are the way to determine the common 
owner’s will.188 However, Pardessus’s theory focuses more on the 
signs of the servitude than on what the common owner was, in fact, 
thinking.189 Although not expressly stating so, the important 
determination under Pardessus’s theory is whether the parties 
viewed the permanent signs as obviously indicative of an apparent 
servitude. Thus, although Pardessus does speak of the common 
owner’s intent, his theory is actually aimed at a determination of 
whether the servitude was apparent to the parties. 
 3. Toullier  
Toullier believes that “it is from [the] former condition [of the 
estates], such as it existed while the two estates were in the same 
hands, that destination results, because this condition manifests his 
will.”190 He explains: “[O]ne perceives destination by the 
disposition and arrangements that the owner made on his houses or 
other estates, either for their utility, or to satisfy his fancy and 
taste.”191 Toullier’s determination requires strong evidence of the 
common owner’s actual intent—his “fancy and taste”—because his 
theory focuses more on what the common owner was thinking than 
the physical situation between the estates.192 Under Toullier’s 
theory, the physical signs of the servitude do not bear on the state of 
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mind of the parties at separation of ownership but simply on what 
the common owner desired to do on his property.193 Toullier thus 
believes that the parties are not agreeing to continue the arrangement 
between the estates but to honor the common owner’s intentions.194  
 4. H. Mazeaud 
Henri Mazeaud’s theoretical basis for destination is similar to 
Planiol’s but differs slightly.195 According to Mazeaud, the type of 
works that a common owner has made on his estate is irrelevant.196 
The works must only “materialize the intention to subjugate one 
part of his estate to the profit of another.”197 Mazeaud believes that 
the materialization of that intention gives rise to the idea of a tacit 
agreement between the parties that the existing situation will be 
become a predial servitude.198 
Thus, Mazeaud’s explanation of destination does require an 
element of the common owner’s intent, but it differs from Planiol’s 
explanation because the works “materialize” the intention. The 
important element of Mazeaud’s theory is not the common owner’s 
intent but the works’ materialization of an intention. The word 
materialize implies that the intention is obvious to the parties at the 
moment that ownership is severed.199 Therefore, Mazeaud’s 
“materialization” of intention is actually another way of saying that 
the servitude is apparent.  
B. The “Pure Tacit Agreement Camp” 
French doctrine’s general acceptance of tacit agreement theory 
likely results from a desire to conceptually justify destination as a 
means of creating a conventional predial servitude. Under tacit 
agreement theory, the implied agreement itself is considered the 
title.200 The tacit agreement becomes the necessary “convention.” 
Thus, tacit agreement conceptually explains how it is possible for 
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destination to create a conventional predial servitude even though 
there was no actual agreement between the parties.201 
On the other hand, the theory that the common owner must 
intend to create a servitude does not explain how destination creates 
a conventional servitude despite the absence of an agreement.202 The 
intent theory presupposes that a servitude was created by means of a 
unilateral act—the will of the common owner.203 However, it is 
conceptually impossible for a conventional servitude to be created 
this way because the common owner cannot “agree” with himself to 
create a conventional servitude.204 Therefore, destination cannot be 
thought of as a continuation of the common owner’s will because 
his will cannot create a servitude for the parties to continue.205  
Tacit agreement theory solves this problem by granting an 
implied title to the servitude at the moment that two people own the 
estates.206 Several French writers strongly adhere to that theory’s 
theoretical advantages and couch destination only in terms of a tacit 
agreement.207 These writers in the “pure tacit agreement camp”—
including Laurent, Aubry and Rau, and Baudry-Lacantinerie—either 
reject the idea of the common owner’s intent as irrelevant or neglect 
to mention it at all.  
 1. Laurent 
In Laurent’s view, destination is simply a manner of granting 
title to a servitude by recognizing a tacit agreement between the 
parties.208 Laurent states that “the servitude is born, not of the 
exclusive will of the owner who destined one of his estates to the 
service of the other, but of the combination of wills of those who 
took part in the contract which operated to divide the estates.”209 
Laurent views this explanation as especially reasonable in cases of 
partition, where “the proprietor being dead, his will is for nothing in 
establishing the servitude; it can only be shown by the destination to 
which he gave the estates.”210 
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Thus, Laurent views destination only as a matter involving the 
parties at severance of ownership. Laurent is correct that the 
common owner’s will cannot be ascertained if he is dead, and, 
therefore, only the exterior signs can indicate the existence of a 
servitude. But the signs do not relate to the owner’s will—they 
relate only to the tacit “combination of wills” of the parties at the 
time that ownership of the estates is divided.211 Although especially 
relevant in partition cases, Laurent’s “combination of wills” theory 
is also useful for instances in which the common owner is a party to 
the separation of ownership, such as when he sells part of his estate 
to another. In such a case, according to Laurent, both parties’ 
intentions regarding the servitude should be inferred from the 
situation existing at the time they contracted.212 For example, the 
seller should not be able to claim later that he never intended to 
create the servitude, thereby unilaterally depriving the buyer of its 
use, when the signs clearly suggested otherwise. Laurent’s theory 
avoids such inequitable results. 
 2. Aubry and Rau 
Aubry and Rau support tacit agreement theory as the basis of 
destination by implication.213 They make no mention of the 
common owner’s will.214 Instead, they propose that one who 
invokes destination must simply produce his title to the estate and 
show that he is the successor of the person who created the 
preexisting situation.215 Although not expressly rejecting the 
jurisprudential intent requirement, Aubry and Rau’s neglect of the 
subject is noteworthy. 
Aubry and Rau’s explanation of destination truly follows the 
letter of the law in that the French Civil Code articles on destination 
provide for the exact same process.216 Under the French Civil Code, 
the intent to create a servitude is implied when a party proves that 
the two estates belonged at one time to the same person and that it 
was that person who created the works.217 Louisiana Civil Code 
article 741 produces the same result. The first paragraph of article 
741 provides that destination can apply only when a single owner 
establishes a relationship between two estates.218 The second 
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paragraph of the article states that an apparent servitude is created 
“at the moment the two estates cease to belong to the same 
owner.”219 Therefore, if a party proves that a common owner created 
the situation giving rise to an apparent servitude, and the party is the 
common owner’s successor, then destination applies.  
 3. Baudry-Lacantinerie  
Baudry-Lacantinerie is perhaps the strongest critic of a 
unilateral intent element. In the section of his property treatise 
covering destination, he writes:  
This mode of establishing servitudes is not based on the 
unilateral will of the owner of the two estates, on the sole 
intention of the [owner] at the moment he created the state of 
things which, later on, will be constitutive of the servitude; 
the foundation of this mode is on a tacit agreement relative 
to the maintenance of the state of things anterior to the 
creation of the servitude, to the effect that the consensual 
element only appears at the moment of division of the 
estates.220 
Thus, to Baudry-Lacantinerie, the common owner’s intent is 
irrelevant. The determinative factor, according to Baudry-
Lacantinerie, is whether the burden was apparent.221 Due to the 
obvious burden on one of the estates, “the parties could not ignore 
its existence” or consider it to be “precarious or transitory.”222 
Baudry-Lacantinerie’s position is that if the parties said nothing 
about the servitude, they obviously wanted to maintain the status 
quo.223 Thus, Baudry-Lacantinerie focuses on the exterior signs 
relation to the parties’ reasonable state of mind, and the common 
owner’s intentions do not bear on his analysis at all. 
However, Baudry-Lacantinerie does not completely disavow an 
element of intent; he argues that “it is important to take into 
consideration the intention of he who presided over the arrangement 
when one wants to determine the extent of the servitude.”224 
According to Baudry-Lacantinerie, the manner of use of a 
destination servitude is governed “by the state of things from which 
the servitude was born.”225 Such exercise is “restricted to the 
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advantages that the owner of the two estates had gotten out of the 
state of things created or maintained by him.”226 To resolve a 
dispute over the extent of a benefit to the dominant estate, “the state 
of facts anterior to the birth of the servitude must be consulted, and 
thus the intention of he who presided over the arrangement.”227 In 
other words, the common owner’s intention is only relevant when 
the parties disagree regarding the scope of the rights entailed within 
the servitude. 
For example, consider a modified version of the Phipps case.228 
Assume that instead of a driveway, the common owner left in place 
a narrow alley not meant for vehicular use. Assume further that 
Phipps claimed that the existing walkway created a servitude of 
passage which entitled him to expand the walkway’s use so he could 
drive a vehicle over it. Under Baudry-Lacantinerie’s theory, Schupp 
could successfully counter that the common owner never intended 
the walkway to be used for vehicular passage because the exterior 
signs clearly suggested pedestrian use. Under Baudry-Lacantinerie’s 
theory, the common owner’s intent is certainly relevant in this 
scenario because the issue is what kind of servitude was created. The 
actual creation of the servitude, however, involves no inquiry into 
the common owner’s intent.  
C. Which Camp Should Courts Follow?  
The differing approaches of the “intent camp” and the “pure 
tacit agreement camp” illustrate that Professor Yiannopoulos was 
one-sided in his reliance on the intent theory.229 French writers 
approach destination using various theories and disagree as to 
whether the common owner’s intent has any relevance. Therefore, 
Professor Yiannopoulos’s intent requirement does not paint a 
complete picture. Despite Professor Yiannopoulos’s invaluable 
contributions to Louisiana law, courts should not feel bound to 
inquire into the intent of the common owner simply because of his 
position that the French espouse this idea. Louisiana courts ought to 
take into account both the “intent camp” and the “pure tacit 
agreement camp.”  
Arguably, Professor Yiannopoulos may have pitched his tent 
with the wrong camp. Professor Yiannopoulos relied heavily on 
Planiol’s proposition that tacit agreement theory justifies an element 
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of proof of the common owner’s intent.230 This proposition suffers 
from serious conceptual flaws.231 Whereas tacit agreement theory 
requires an objective, bilateral analysis of the reasonable beliefs of 
both parties, the common owner’s intent requires a subjective, 
unilateral analysis into his actions.232 As such, tacit agreement 
theory and the intent requirement are conceptually incompatible.233  
Furthermore, the cases Planiol cited in support of the intent 
requirement are not helpful. Because Louisiana’s Civil Code articles 
on destination are rooted in the Napoleonic Code, French 
jurisprudence interpreting the French Civil Code’s destination 
regime could be persuasive.234 Therefore, Professor Yiannopoulos 
justifiably looked to those cases in his article.235 However, these 
judgments provide no method for determining a common owner’s 
subjective intent and rarely, if ever, provide any reasoning for the 
introduction of a subjective element to destination issues.236 
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Although these judgments did focus on proving the intent of the 
common owner, the issue was often whether the servitude was 
merely personal in nature.237 The conceptual difficulties inherent in 
Planiol’s intent requirement are not illuminated by French 
jurisprudence. Accordingly, these judgments are of scant utility to 
Louisiana courts and should be read with a wary eye.  
As an alternative to Planiol, Louisiana courts might consider 
Baudry-Lacantinerie’s sound theories regarding destination. His 
theory avoids the theoretical complications posed by Planiol’s 
introduction of a subjective intent element. Because a common 
owner cannot create a conventional predial servitude by himself, a 
tacit agreement between the parties to create the servitude is a 
justifiable way to view destination.238 A tacit agreement can be 
inferred when the exterior signs of a burden are of such a degree that 
“the parties could not ignore its existence.”239 This inquiry involves 
how the objective signs of a burden should have affected the parties’ 
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reasonable state of mind and not how the signs evidence what the 
common owner intended to do when he created the works.  
Furthermore, Baudry-Lacantinerie is justified in his position that 
intent is only relevant when the extent of a servitude is disputed.240 
The use and extent of a predial servitude are governed by the title 
that created it.241 In the case of destination, the law recognizes 
destination as a title for conventional and apparent servitudes.242 
This fictitious title can only be the situation existing at separation of 
ownership because destination only arises in the absence of an 
agreement.243 Therefore, the situation between the estates governs 
the use and extent of the servitude. Because there is no written title, 
the only way to determine the extent of a destination servitude is to 
examine evidence of the benefit the common owner intended to 
confer upon the dominant estate.244 Evidence of the common 
owner’s intent is relevant in this scenario because it relates to what 
the parties expected the situation to be. However, regarding the 
creation of a servitude, the common owner’s intent is irrelevant 
because that issue is confined to whether the parties believed a 
burden existed on one of the estates. 
The writers in the “pure tacit agreement camp”—especially 
Baudry-Lacantinerie—provide other views on destination that 
Professor Yiannopoulos perhaps should have considered. Their 
explanations of destination are less conceptually troublesome than 
those who subscribe to the idea that the common owner’s intent is 
relevant. Louisiana courts ought to consider the advantages of taking 
the pure tacit agreement approach.  
IV. THE INCOHERENCE OF THE “INTENT” IDEA 
The intent requirement is now applied in Louisiana destination 
law because of Professor Yiannopoulos’s adoption of the idea.245 
The Bienville court, “free[d]” by Professor Yiannopoulos’s assertion 
that “intent is no longer presumed,”246 explained destination as 
follows: 
A servitude that is created by destination of the owner is 
based on the idea that when the owner of two estates 
transfers one of them to another person, there is a tacit 
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agreement between the parties that the existing relationship 
between the estates will be maintained. Thus, the common 
owner must intend to create an apparent servitude and such 
intent must be evidenced by exterior signs which are 
consistent with the nature and extent of the servitude 
claimed.247 
The intent requirement’s inherent theoretical difficulties are 
readily apparent in the Bienville court’s statement. The second 
sentence does not follow from the first. The parties, at separation 
of ownership, cannot tacitly agree to continue a conventional 
servitude that was never created in the first place.248 Tacit 
agreement theory avoids this conundrum by implying a fictional 
title to a conventional servitude.249 To inject an element of the 
common owner’s subjective intent brings the conundrum back to 
the forefront.  
A. Conceptual Differences Between Intent and Tacit Agreement 
“[A] tacit agreement between the parties” and the idea that “the 
common owner must intend to create an apparent servitude” are 
different concepts.250 Tacit agreement theory is an objective idea 
that implies a bilateral agreement between the parties.251 On the 
other hand, the intent requirement is a subjective idea that relates to 
the common owner’s unilateral intentions.252  
Tacit agreement theory essentially determines what the parties 
should have subjectively believed based upon the objective exterior 
signs of a burden on the servient estate.253 If a burden was 
sufficiently apparent to the parties, the law implies a subjective 
agreement between them that the burden will remain in effect.254 
Because there is no actual agreement between the parties, the 
objective exterior signs are the only way to determine what the 
parties should have reasonably believed.255 In other words, the 
subjective element of the tacit agreement can only be established 
through objective means. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, a 
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tacit agreement between the parties is an objective inquiry. The 
question of the common owner’s intent is far more subjective. 
Under the intent requirement, the exterior signs do not imply any 
state of mind on the part of the common owner—they must prove 
his actual, unilateral intent to create a servitude.256 
B. Louisiana Should Take an Objective Approach 
Louisiana courts should tackle destination issues objectively, 
framed in terms of tacit agreement theory alone. Practically, this 
approach makes more sense than requiring courts to probe the 
common owner’s subjective intent. Louisiana Civil Code article 741 
provides a simple, objective method for establishing a conventional 
predial servitude despite the absence of an agreement between the 
parties.257 When the exterior signs of a burden clearly suggest that 
the parties cannot ignore its existence, article 741 is meant to supply 
a fictional agreement between them.258 As explained by French 
doctrine, tacit agreement theory is designed to supply the same 
fictional agreement as a form of title.259 Thus, framing destination in 
terms of the objective tacit agreement theory aids in the application 
of article 741.  
Conversely, the intent requirement frustrates the application of 
article 741 because it may sometimes be difficult for the exterior 
signs to prove what the common owner subjectively intended. For 
example, consider a situation in which the common owner of a 
large estate creates a charge in favor one portion of it, such as a 
walkway to a back house. The owner then sells the entire estate to 
someone else and moves away. The new owner decides to make 
the walkway a driveway and improves it accordingly. The second 
owner then dies, and the estate is partitioned. Many years later, a 
dispute arises between the two new owners regarding the 
driveway. If a court were required to probe into subjective intent, it 
would be unclear whether the exterior signs should relate to the 
intent of the original, common owner who created the walkway or 
the intent of the subsequent common owner who improved it into a 
driveway. Either way, a court may have a difficult time trying to 
probe into the subjective state of mind of the absent original owner 
or the long deceased second owner. However, if the court were to 
apply article 741 objectively, the determination would simply be 
whether the parties should have reasonably believed that the 
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driveway would remain there. An objective analysis of the exterior 
signs would easily resolve this dispute. 
As the foregoing example illustrates, an objective approach 
would lessen Louisiana courts’ burden when deciding destination 
cases. An objective approach is especially valuable in situations in 
which the common owner is not a party, is absent, or is deceased.260 
Determining whether the burden was apparent under the meaning of 
article 707 would effectively resolve any destination dispute without 
the parties having to prove what the common owner intended when 
he created the situation at issue.261 The objective inquiry of whether 
a party’s belief is reasonable based on exterior signs is relatively 
simple to determine because it is grounded on tangible, empirical 
evidence.262 Whether a belief is reasonable would depend on the 
circumstances of each case, based on the exterior signs available to 
the parties at the moment that common ownership ceased.263 
For example, the Bienville and Phipps cases could have been 
decided far more easily than they were.264 In Phipps, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court reached the right result but for the wrong reason. 
The court felt that the exterior signs were indicative of the common 
owner’s subjective intent to create an apparent servitude.265 The 
practical effect of Phipps is to put a greater burden of proof on the 
party claiming destination. It naturally takes more evidence to prove 
the common owner’s subjective intent than to prove a reasonable 
inference of intent based on exterior signs. An objective application 
of article 741 streamlines the determination of the issue. If the 
Phipps court had applied article 741 objectively, there would have 
been no question that an apparent servitude had come into existence 
the moment that the estates were divided. The driveway itself should 
have suggested to the parties that a servitude of passage would exist 
between the estates.266 A waste of judicial resources, as well as 
Phipps’s time and money, could have been avoided under a simple, 
objective application of the article. Similarly, the Bienville court 
would have been able to reach its correct conclusion but for the right 
reason. Under an objective approach, the court could have 
determined that the servitude was not apparent when Royal sold the 
garage and dispensed with the destination argument easily.267  
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An objective approach to destination is also desirable from a 
policy standpoint. Destination protects buyers’ reasonable 
expectations as to what they are contracting for when they buy 
property.268 When the contract of sale says nothing about an obvious 
burden on one of the estates, destination protects a party who 
reasonably expected the situation to remain in place. An objective 
determination of whether the burden was apparent allows a party to 
easily prove that its expectation regarding the servitude was 
reasonable. On the other hand, the parties’ reasonable beliefs are not 
protected when evidence of the common owner’s intent enters into 
the equation.269 Most buyers probably do not expect to one day have 
to litigate issues regarding what someone many years ago intended 
to do on their property. It is unreasonable to expect them to do so.  
CONCLUSION 
The French institution of destination is an important part of 
Louisiana civilian property law. If Louisiana courts were to consider 
the various French doctrinal approaches to destination, it would 
become clear that an objective approach is appropriate. Destination 
is meant to imply a title to a conventional predial servitude despite 
the absence of an agreement.270 Tacit agreement theory is a useful 
theoretical device to aid in the interpretation of destination. Under 
tacit agreement theory, the objective signs of a burden create the 
fictional agreement between the parties. Tacit agreement theory thus 
explains how a conventional predial servitude can be created 
without an express “convention.”271 The soundest theoretical 
explanation belongs to Baudry-Lacantinerie—if intent is relevant at 
all, it only bears on the extent of the servitude.272 In other words, 
intent should only be looked to when the physical manifestation of 
the servitude creates an ambiguity as to the use for which the 
servitude was meant.273  
To avoid unjust results like the lower courts’ determination in 
the Phipps case, courts should not look to evidence of the common 
owner’s intent.274 When deciding a destination issue, a court would 
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do well to adhere to the old adage, the writing’s on the wall. In 
terms of predial servitudes, the expression refers to obvious 
evidence of a burden on the estate. When it comes to the fate of the 
intent requirement, perhaps the writing’s on the wall as well. 
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